In this study, we show how medical devices used for patient care can be made safer if various cognitive factors involved in patient management are taken into consideration during the design phase. The objective of this paper is to describe a methodology for obtaining insights into patient safety features-derived from investigations of institutional decision making-that could be incorporated into medical devices by their designers. The design cycle of a product, be it a medical device, software, or any kind of equipment, is similar in concept, and course. Through a series of steps we obtained information related to medical errors and patient safety. These were then utilized to customize the generic device design cycle in ways that would improve the production of critical care devices. First, we provided individuals with different levels of expertise in the clinical, administrative, and engineering domains of a large hospital setting with hypothetical clinical scenarios, each of which described a medical error event involving health professionals and medical devices. Then, we asked our subjects to ''think-aloud'' as they read through each scenario. Using a set of questions as probes, we then asked our subjects to identify key errors and attribute them to various players. We recorded and transcribed the responses and conducted a cognitive task analysis of each scenario to identify different entities as ''constant,'' ''partially modifiable,'' or ''modifiable.'' We compared our subjectsÕ responses to the results of the task analysis and then mapped them to the modifiable entities. Lastly, we coded the relationships of these entities to the errors in medical devices. We propose that the incorporation of these modifiable entities into the device design cycle could improve the device end product for better patient safety management.
Introduction
''DonÕt blame me for the article; blame the typewriter that printed it!''-Anonymous.
Even if the above statement were true, when the question of errors in clinical settings arises, assigning the blame does not help solve the problem. The individual with closest proximity (the operator) to the device most often bears the brunt of blame [1] . The critical care setting is a high-tension environment with a large number of users interacting with an even larger number of devices. Errors related to devices or users in the healthcare setup are drawing increased attention towards them as their recognition and reporting has improved [2, 3] . We need to analyze these errors to devise measures that will help prevent them in future.
The use of devices in medical care was introduced for many reasons, the primary ones being related patient monitoring and automation of procedures in order to save time and increase accuracy. The devices were not intended to replace human caregivers but to supplement their tasks. The effectiveness of these devices relied largely on how well the user operated them. The concept of including patient safety measures in medical devices slowly evolved as the impact of errors due to the improper design, implementation, and use, of medical devices started being recognized. In addition to introducing medical errors, the newly acquired devices raised other issues, including the disruption of organizational culture and concern among physicians regarding the changes in their professional relationships and established workflow routines [4] .
Evolution of the medical device safety net
From a general standpoint, when a new device is invented, the primary concern at the time is to achieve the desired functionality. With constant use, shortcomings or possible improvements for the device become evident; with modifications, subsequent generations of the device evolve into much better contraptions. Similarly medical devices and instruments have evolved in functionality by incorporation of more and more features and automaticity. With development of more programmable and independently operating devices, it became imperative that they not compromise patient safety in any way. Fig. 1 illustrates the ''Evolution of the Patient Safety Net,'' delineating how different generations of medical devices evolved to provide safety along with their intended functionality.
The first generation of medical devices was patient safety naïve because their primary aim was to achieve a certain functionality. The need for safety features was unrecognized until a medical error or error in the making was observed. The earliest safety features included alarms, constraints, input confirmations and reconfirmations, but their scope was limited to the immediate domain of device interface and operation.
Considering the fact that medical devices do not work in isolation, but interact with various other entities and personnel working in the same setting, the next evolutionary stage in terms of patient safety measures should account for these factors as well. From the time a clinician decides a plan of action to the actual execution of this plan, a number of cognitive processes and sequential events occur. The communication cascade triggered by this situation is mostly concentrated around nurses and physicians [5] . Performing a cognitive task analysis of real clinical settings and understanding the peculiarities of the health care system can provide cues for new design principles in device development.
Collaborative decision making, devices, and errors
The Intensive Care Unit (ICU) is a unique and dynamic setting where multiple individuals are involved in the common process of providing both physical as well as emotional care and support to critically ill patients. From afar (or to an outsider), the workflow situation is difficult to keep track off and, to some extent, may seem very disorganized, especially with all the buzzing alarms and the flashing display screens of medical equipment adding to the confusion. The high-risk patients admitted to the ICU have a number of medical complications that require rigorous monitoring, interventions, and an array of medications to stabilize them. Consulting physicians, attending physicians, residents and nurses are all involved in patient care decision making, each of them possessing specialized and sometimes overlapping knowledge [6] . In the face of the apparent chaos the team works together in a coordinated way and relies on various sources of information to carry out its tasks [7] . In addition, sophisticated patient care technology is omnipresent in contemporary health care assisting health care providers with monitoring and treating the patient. The use of such technology, however, also causes an additional cognitive load for its users in terms of device operation, and this at times can disturb the delicate equilibrium of the collaborative decision-making process. This gives us many reasons for refuting the traditional approach of blaming the clinician or the nurse alone for medical errors and for viewing medical errors as a complex interplay of many individual, organizational, situational, and technological factors [8] .
Background and theoretical framework
The last 100 years have seen the most dramatic successes in the field of medicine. From the discovery of EhrlichÕs magic bullets for treating infections to the genesis of highly techno-centric equipment for diagnosis and treatment, the improved longevity of human life could possibly be the single most important outcome. But when the same equipment becomes responsible for major or even minor compromises in patient health, it becomes a matter of grave concern. The medical error body of research emerged in the early 1990s, with landmark studies conducted by Lucian Leape and David Bates [9, 10] and supported by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) [11] . Their work involved the identification and evaluation of system failures that underlie adverse drug events and potentially adverse drug events. The most common defects were found in systems meant for disseminating drug knowledge and for timely access to patient records. They concluded that changes made to the systems to improve the dissemination and display of drug and patient data would make drug-related errors less likely [12, 13] .
But the problem of medical errors still did not get the amount of attention that it deserved. Then, in November 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report titled To Err Is Human: Building A Safer Health System was released, focusing a great deal of attention on the issue of medical errors and patient safety [14] . Two large studies, one conducted in Colorado and Utah and the other in New York, found that adverse events occurred in 2.9 and 3.7% of hospitalizations, respectively. When extrapolated to the approximate 33.6 million admissions to US hospitals in 1997, the results of the study in Colorado and Utah implied that at least 44,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors. The combined goal of the recommendations was to create sufficient pressure in the external environment to make errors costly to health care organizations and providers, so that they would be compelled to take action to improve patient safety. It also emphasized the need to enhance knowledge and tools that improve patient safety and break down legal and cultural barriers that would impede improvements in safety. The impact following the article was extraordinary, and researchers began to study the nature of errors related to human, device, environmental, and socio-cultural factors in a detailed manner.
In this study, we show how medical devices used for patient care can be made safer if various cognitive factors involved in patient management are taken into consideration during the design phase. Medical device design is similar to the manufacture of any other product in that understanding the requirements and expectations of the stakeholders is the first step. This knowledge is then utilized for building a prototype, which is then subjected to a series of evaluations and testing cycles. The feedback from these evaluations is used for modifications and improvement, giving rise to the final product [15, 16] . But ''final'' is misleading because the product continues to change as different versions of it are released over time, each one being an improvement over its predecessor.
A concept proposed by Patrick D. Fleck, president of Cooper Interaction Design [17] illustrates an interesting aspect of decision making in the product development cycle (not specifically for medical devices). A decisionmaking model for innovative product design called the OODA loop was described (see Fig. 2 ), its four main steps being observation, orientation, decision, and action. The gist of the model is that if one cannot make clear observations and form viable options, then the ability to make sound decisions and carry them out effectively crumbles.
Applying the model to the domain of medical device engineering, we can appreciate that in a medical setting the variables are far too many. The operation of a device depends on a complex network of communication among many role players, each with differing cognitive, and executive capabilities. Also, other factors of the health care setting which are apparently unrelated to the focus of the product (e.g., administration, policies), affect its functioning in multiple ways.
The current status of medical device engineering is that during the design phase it follows almost the same rules as those for other manufactured products. The difference lies in the rigorous testing and evaluation that is performed before a medical device is made available in the market. This is necessary because these devices are directly or indirectly related to the health and life of a patient. To satisfy regulatory issues, most biomedical systems must have documentation to show that they were managed, designed, built, tested, delivered, and used according to a planned, approved process [18] . In the US, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adopts an adversarial position. It actively regulates individual devices and drugs, assuming that new therapies and products are unsafe and do not work until proven otherwise. This process is not considered completely fail proof in preventing the release of unsafe therapies and products, but can easily create a bottleneck in the development process.
The health effects of this bottleneck have been quantified by comparing approval times in the US to approval times in Europe. The approval of biotech drugs in Europe outpaces those in the US primarily because of different hierarchical and policy issues, although it is difficult to measure the effect on quality control [19] . Despite our stringent measures, we do find faulty and potentially hazardous medical devices installed in health care institutions in the US. To curb such occurrences, initiative needs to be taken to focus on the device design phase and to bring human and other situational factors that are unique to health care into consideration from the very beginning.
FDA data collected between 1985 and 1989 demonstrated that 45-50% of all device recalls stemmed from poor product design. Furthermore, the FDA recognizes that a poorly designed user interface can induce errors and operating inefficiencies even when operated by a well-trained, competent user [20, 21] . Poor device design also leads to great economic waste as studies have shown that making changes to device design after shipping is about 40 times more expensive than when performed at the prototype development stage [22] . This research discusses the methodology used to acquire insight into these factors and their subsequent link to device design.
Cognitive science has played an increasingly important role in researching the above mentioned factors since its methods and theories illuminate different facets of the design and implementation of information. It provides important insight into the nature of cognitive processes involved in human-computer interaction and thereby improves the application of medical information systems by addressing the knowledge, memory, and strategies used in a variety of cognitive activities [23] . It also plays a role in characterizing and enhancing human performance by the formalized study of humancomputer (or device) interaction using such methods as cognitive walkthroughs, task analyzes, and heuristic evaluations [24, 26] . The purpose of a cognitive walkthrough is to evaluate the cognitive processes of users performing a task. The method involves identifying the goals and the sequences of action required to accomplish a given task. The method is intended to identify potential usability problems that may impede the successful completion of a task [27] . A cognitive task analysis is concerned with characterizing the decisionmaking and reasoning skills and the information-processing needs of subjects as they perform activities and tasks that require processing complex information [28, 29] . Such analyzes have also been applied to the design of systems to create a better understanding of human information needs in their development [23, [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] .
Heuristic evaluation is a usability inspection method that has been found to be a useful tool for medical device evaluation [25] . It refers to a class of techniques in which the evaluators examine the interface of a device for usability issues. They walk through the interface and identify elements that violate usability heuristics. It can be applied to paper or electronic mock-ups or prototypes as well as to completely implemented designs. There are a few limitations to this technique: one is that it focuses on a single device or application and therefore may not identify problems that arise because of the environment in which the device is to be used; another is that it does not indicate elements of the interface that correctly follow usability guidelines; nor does it reveal any major missing functionality.
The immediate environment of the device is the individual interacting with it. HCI is a special and important area of study. Human factors engineering is a discipline that seeks to design devices, software, and systems to meet the needs, capabilities, and limitations of the users, rather than expecting the users to adapt to the design. A complete human factors engineering analysis for medical devices or software systems includes four major components: user, function, task, and representational analyzes [34] .
In conclusion, the importance of cognitive science methods in patient safety research especially in examining how cognitive factors affect performance and how informatics methods can identify sources of errors and provide interventions to reduce them [35] needs to be considered. It is time to recognize that cognitive factors are especially important in understanding and promoting safe practices.
Methods

Participants
We selected a total of nine subjects for the study, including an anesthesiology and critical care specialist, two nurses, a physicianÕs assistant, an anesthesiology resident, two biomedical engineers, and two administrators. We wanted the subjects to be representative of the range of professional groups that deal with devicerelated issues during device selection and purchase, use, and maintenance. We identified these groups on the basis of a previous study of the decision-making process in infusion pump selection, conducted by our research team (Keselman et al. [36] ), which also included administrators, biomedical engineers, nurses, and physicians. The nine subjects chosen for this study had clinical, engineering, or administrative responsibilities and were representative of the people responsible for making decisions about device use, maintenance and selection in a hospital. The subjects had varying levels of expertise and came from different educational backgrounds as is generally found in a typical large-scale health institution.
Materials
Scenarios
The materials used in the study included three scenarios, each describing medical errors that involved medical devices. Our goal in designing the scenarios was to create hypothetical situations based on realistic events and frequently used devices with relatively complex user-interfaces. We also wanted the scenarios to represent a variety of hospital settings and a representative range of medical professionals interacting with devices (as possible sources of human error). The scenarios were developed on the basis of examples from the FDAÕs medical device report files [18] . A clinical consultant assisted in the evaluation of the appropriateness of the scenarios with respect to the projectÕs objectives.
A brief synopsis of each of the three scenarios is given below. The complete scenarios have been described in Appendix A. The devices and the people potentially constituting the human component of error are listed in parentheses.
1. Scenario 1 (nitroglycerine, infusion pump, and nurse). A nurse is receiving multiple orders for multiple patients at the same time in a busy and stressful emergency room setting. For one particular patient she receives four drug orders in one measuring unit, and the fifth order for nitroglycerine infusion in another unit of dosage. She ends up programming the nitroglycerine infusion pump with a dosage in units similar to the other four orders. The patient gets overdosed and experiences a dangerous fall in blood pressure, but is rescued when the critical care team discovers this. 2. Scenario 2 (oxygen, ventilator, and physician). In a pediatric ICU setting, a patient is receiving oxygen through a ventilator. A resident comes and changes the flow rate from one to one point five. He is unaware of the fact that the device can only be put on discrete settings of one, two, three, etc. and does not operate when the dial is between these numbers.
Consequently, the child receives no oxygen at all. The error is discovered and the child is given higher flow rates and rescued.
Scenario 3 (heparin, infusion pump, and physician).
A patient is receiving intravenous heparin via an infusion pump. A resident changes the dose delivered to a higher rate and then is required to change it back to the maintenance dose. In doing so he overlooks the ÔconfirmÕ button for the dose change to maintenance and the patient continues to receive the high dosage.
The pump does keep beeping as an indicator but the patientÕs family members are the only ones to notice it and do not take any action. The nurse only discovers the error the next morning.
Semi-structured interview
A set of five questions was designed to elicit a thinkaloud protocol in response to each scenario. The questions were designed with the purpose of eliciting subjectsÕ assessment of the source and seriousness of the error, without prompting them to place blame on a specific individual. Response-specific probes and clarifications followed each of the five key questions. The key questions and the rationale for each are given below.
Q1. Please provide a summary of the scenario (without looking at it).
[To assess the accuracy of the subjectÕs problem representation.] Q2. What were the causes for the error in the scenario?
[To assess the subjectÕs perception of the source of errors, without prompting identification of the human component.] Q3. Please rank these causes on a scale from most serious to the least serious.
[To assess the subjectÕs perception of the relative seriousness of various causes.] Q4. Who do you think was responsible for these errors?
[To assess the subjectÕs perception of the human component (and attribution) of the errors.] Q5. What steps could be taken to prevent these errors?
[To assess perception of potential safeguards and their locations.]
Procedure
We provided the subjects with the scenarios (one by one) and asked each to answer a set of five questions. The questions were aimed at eliciting a think-aloud protocol in a semi-structured fashion. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed. The transcripts were then parsed into idea segments. Each segment consisted of one stated cause of the error and the explanation for that cause. A segment varied in length and could include a sentence clause, a sentence, or in some cases the main sentence and one or two supporting sentences.
The interview data were then analyzed using a hierarchical scheme of thematic codes (e.g., [37] ). Some of the codes were top-level categories, others were lower-level codes subsumed by the top-level codes. The development of the coding scheme involved a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Thematic coding that is partly based on categories that are not predefined, but emerge in the course of data analysis, falls into the theoretical framework of the grounded theory approach to data analysis (e.g., [38] ).
Grounded theory is ''theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through research process.'' This approach assumes a close relationship among the data, the analysis, and the theory that emerges from the data. The researcher sets out to conduct an investigation with a minimal amount of preconceived hypotheses, allowing the data to tell the story from the participantÕs perspective. The focus is on collecting rich descriptive data that cannot be easily subjected to statistical analysis. This research approach is appropriate for investigating complex topics in their naturalistic contexts. It is concerned with ''understanding behavior from the subjectÕs own frame of reference'' (Bogdan and Biklen [39] ). Given that medical care is a complex collaborative process, with medical errors closely tied to the settings in which they occur, we felt that situating our work in the grounded theory approach would help us do justice to the nature of the process we set out to study. The combination of theory-driven and data-driven approaches offered the advantage of being attuned to the richness of naturalistic qualitative data, while still relying on a preliminary framework for maintaining objectivity.
We developed several coding categories based on the study objectives and the responses to interview questions (e.g., error involved, individual responsible, and severity of the error) and using the methodological approach of grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss). Other categories emerged from the empirical review of the data. A group of three investigators reviewed a subset of protocols, creating coding categories until reaching saturation (i.e., the point at which no new categories emerged). At that point, coding categories were grouped and organized in a hierarchical fashion. These categories included error involved, individual responsible, severity of the error, modifiability of the error, suggested solution to the error, and the errorÕs relationship to the device. Finally, three coders jointly conducted two iterations of data coding, assigning codes to segments and resolving disagreements through discussion. The final top-and lower-level categories are discussed in the results section and the related (Tables 1-9 ) can be found in Appendix A.
Results and analysis
Studies in the HCI field are essentially composed of two elements: Individuals and Machines. We chose to divide our study into two sections and analyze the composite HCI entity from the Individuals and Devices perspective. The IndividualsÕ perspective focuses on health care professionals in the critical care setting and how their perceptions and interpretations of an error differ as a function of expertise. This aspect of the study is described in detail elsewhere (Laxmisan et al., 2004) , but in summary the results show differences in error perception as a function of expertise as well as the nature of the task performed by the individual [40] . Errors pertaining to the critical events of scenarios were identified such that they fell under or were related to the area of expertise of the individual (e.g., A biomedical engineer performed a much better identification of device related errors that were not picked up by the administrators). In research along similar lines, Chung et al. [41] developed a methodology for predicting human error during operation of a medical device by using techniques to evaluate the interface and identify potential error-inducing features and steps.
This paper addresses the Devices perspective. The error categories that were derived from the transcripts of each subject for each of the scenarios were further qualified based on modifiability and relation to medical device (discussed later in Sections 5.2 and 5.3). The error categories were also ascribed a set of the following variables: broad error category, individual implicated, modifiability of the error, and relationship of error to the medical device. Those categories in which the values for all four of these variables were unique were pooled together and treated as the final set. This set was then used for deriving guidelines for the device design phase.
Coding scheme development
At the end of multiple rounds of coding, a total of 54 unique error categories was identified (see Appendix A). These were then further assorted into six broad categories. In cases of overlap where a single error category seemed to belong to more than one broad category, the assignment was made by reviewing the context of the error in the related transcript segment. The six categories are given below.
Administration-related categories. Factors responsible for the error that deal with the training and education of staff, device in-servicing policies, device purchasing, and device retirement (five subcategories came under this category). Device-related categories. Those errors in which the medical device used in the scenario was held directly responsible for the mishap were considered to be device related. Poor user interfaces, faulty design, and lack of inbuilt logic are examples of categories that fall under this heading (15 subcategories came under this category). Situation-related categories. Situational factors and surroundings that at the given time were hostile or indifferent to the workflow and users involved. (Only one subcategory-environmental stress/task overload-was present). Policy-related categories. Errors occurring due to bad protocol, lack of standards, and vague workflow policies are included in this category. One example of this category are order format errors, which are due to lack of standards for units, mode (verbal vs. written), or execution steps (15 sub-categories were policy related). User error. When the individual identified in the error setting is responsible for the error. User errors have specific categories denoting carelessness, oversight, lack of knowledge, etc (15 sub-categories were individual/user related). Setup-related categories. This category includes errors caused by the floor setting or geographical organization of devices, patients, and interface/alarms (Three sub-categories were related to the setup of the critical care environment).
Category division based on modifiability
When the error in question was amenable to modification and potential avoidance, we added an attribute of modifiability based on the following definitions:
Modifiability. Yes (complete)-Indicates that the error category/task in question has a narrower domain, has no or partial human dependent interaction and is amenable to modification. The definition entails discreteness in terms of modifiability and does not imply perfection. Device-related errors mainly fall in this category because a modification made to a device is a discrete change, one that may not counter the error.
Example. Error subcategory. Device design flaw poor visual interface is a totally machine-dependent entity and can be modified by the designers.
Modifiability. No-indicates that the error category/ task in question is of a broader domain or is beyond human control and modifiability.
Example. Error subcategory. Environmental stress/ task overload is something that is not modifiable. Service cannot be denied in emergency health care settings even if things are stressful for the health care providers. Such situations are not modifiable and are of a very unpredictable nature.
Modifiability. Partial-Indicates that the error category/task in question has significant human dependence, which makes the potential modification for improvement dependent on the user in a certain way. Also includes factors that have a partial situational or environmental component which is beyond modification.
Example. Error subcategory. User error-Order interpretation is partially modifiable. Implementing standardized formats for order dispensing smoothes out the process, but there will always be a human element in the situation. Despite the modified standard format, the person receiving the order may still interpret it wrongly. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the error categories with respect to modifiability. Of the total (54) error categories, thirty-one were modifiable (57.4%). The largest completely modifiable error category pertained to the medical device-related errors (14) . This was followed by policy and protocol. The largest partially modifiable error category was the user related-error category (14) . This was again expected based on our definition for partially modifiable errors; it also shows that a significant portion of errors is attributed to humans (27.7%).
Category division based on relation of the error to the medical device
All three scenarios involved complex interactions between the healthcare providers and the medical device in the setting. Once the transcripts were coded, the extent of their relation to the medical device was then based on the following definitions:
Direct relationship: Yes-If the error takes place at the level of or directly upon the device during its operation. Example. User error-Lack of knowledge. A discrepancy in the userÕs clinical knowledge that contributes to the medical error has no bearing on the medical device.
Direct relationship: Partial-An error that is located outside of the device domain but directly affects operation of the device. This definition encompasses all error categories that fall between the directly device related and device unrelated categories.
Example. User error-Mislabeling of the infusion pump. The nurse committed the error but because it was done on the device it is classified as partially related to it. Such errors give possible insights on how improvements can be made to the device to prevent the user from making a similar error in the future. In this case, a future improvement could be conceived in terms of the device giving labeling options or prompts for rechecking the label (see Fig. 4 ).
The purpose of adding the device relationship attribute was to demonstrate how the medical device is the nucleus surrounded by all other entities and their related errors. The errors of these entities may have complete, little, or no linkage/relationship to the medical device. This view gives perspective on what potential error domains and cognitive factors outside of the device can be influenced and therefore taken into account by its design; viz. an extension to its safety net. 
Error categories of individual scenarios
The error categories identified by the subjects in the three scenarios that are based on: (1) the nitroglycerine infusion pump; (2) the oxygen ventilator machine; and (3) the heparin infusion pump are as follows: Scenario 1. Nurse programming an infusion pump for nitroglycerine delivery in high-tension critical care setting. Fig. 5 shows the workflow and events occurring in Scenario 1, where the nitroglycerine infusion pump was the medical device involved. Verbal orders for five medications were given to the nurse. One of the five orders differed in the medication units. The overworked nurse, who was attending to other patients at the same time, programmed the pump for the patient with the medication doses mentioned by the doctor but with all five doses in the same units. Nitroglycerine was the medication that was consequently transfused to the patient in the wrong amounts. The pump did not have the internal logic necessary to recognize the over- dose, nor did it provide any feedback regarding the non-standard unit (assuming there are such standards). The overdose of nitroglycerine caused a dangerous fall in the patientÕs blood pressure. Luckily the error was recognized and the patient was saved from permanent harm.
Of the total 54 error categories identified, 26 came from this scenario.
Modifiable error categories. Out of the total 26 error categories 11 (42.3%) were identified as modifiable. Out of these 11 modifiable error categories eight were considered to be in direct relation to the device and three were partially/indirectly related. Partially modifiable error categories. Out of the total 26 error categories 14 (53.8%) were identified as partially modifiable. Out of these 14 partially modifiable error categories two were directly related to the device, eight were considered to be partially/indirectly related, and four were considered to have no relation to the medical device. Non-modifiable error categories. Environmental stress and task overload were considered to be non-modifiable entities with no direct relation to the medical device, and it appeared once (3.9%) Scenario 2: A physician alters oxygen flow through the ventilator in a pediatric critical care setting.
Modifiable error categories. Out of the total 16 error categories 11 (68.75%) were identified as modifiable. Out of these 11 modifiable error categories five were in direct relation to the medical device and the other six were considered to be partially/indirectly related.
Partially modifiable error categories. Out of the total 16 error categories five (31.25%) were identified as partially modifiable. Out of these only two were partially/ indirectly related to the medical device (ventilator) and the other three were not related at all.
Scenario 3: A physician alters the dose of heparin delivered through an infusion pump and fails to hit the confirm button.
Modifiable error categories. Out of the total 31 error categories 15 (48.4%) were identified as modifiable. Out of these 15 modifiable error categories nine were in direct relation to the medical device and six were considered to be partially/indirectly related. Partially modifiable error categories. Out of the total 31 error categories 14 (45.1%) were identified as partially modifiable. Out of these 14 partially modifiable error categories six were considered to be partially/indirectly related to the device and eight were considered to have no relation.
Environmental stress from task overload and errors arising because of changing shifts were considered to be non-modifiable entities with no direct relation to the medical device; each appeared once in the responses (6.4%).
Redesigning the design phase
So far we have captured specific errors occurring in critical care scenarios and have qualified them according to their modifiability and their relationship to the medical device present. Based on the knowledge we gained about these errors we developed the insight necessary for making modifications to the medical device design cycle, such as the inclusion of pointers to the designers on how to consider the prospective setting for the device, involved human factors, and probable error situations. The ultimate objective is to use the cycle for the production of a well-conceived device prototype.
Before we suggest modifications to the device design cycle, we have to understand the concept of design and development planning as stipulated by the FDA. ''Design Control Guidance for Medical Device Manufacturers,'' published by the FDA in 1997, sets out quality assurance practices to be used for the design of medical devices. By design controls they refer to an interrelated set of practices and procedures that should be incorporated into the design and development process, i.e., a system of checks and balances. The design controls are meant to assist the manufacturers in understanding quality system requirements and to ensure that they address the intended use of the device based on the needs of the user and the patient. Given that the cost to correct design errors is lower when errors are detected early in the design and development process [42] , the significance of design control and the importance of a solid design foundation cannot be overstated. Fig. 6 shows a generic medical device design cycle that is based on industrial product development cycles and the waterfall design process constructed by the Medical Devices Bureau of Health in Canada [18] . Review and validation occur at almost every step of the process. ÔDesign inputÕ (or requirements) is an important starting point for the device designers, and essentially implies that requirements are given to the designers by stakeholders and information obtained by the evaluation of existing devices (for which improvements are forthcoming). The device designers translate the requirements and eventually generate a prototype. The prototype has to undergo a number of evaluations, including field-testing, before it is accepted as a final product. Human-computer engineering factors and other usability issues are all part of the design process and are continuously included and improved upon during the cyclic evaluations.
In the cycle shown above the emphasis and discovery of usability issues in the actual setting mainly lie in the field-testing portion of the cycle. In our study, we observed errors in the critical care setting, their modifiability, and their relationship to the medical device involved. Drawing from those errors, we realize how important it is to consider various factors in the health care setting to achieve optimum patient safety. To bring in this next level of safety into the device design, we need to supplement the requirements presented by the stakeholders by adding the new health care setting inputs to the design cycle. These additional inputs, termed Situational or System research, can be divided into the following categories.
Users of the system
Humans have a limited functional spectrum beyond which the caution, vigilance, attention, and memory of a person fail. No one can be a perfect worker at all times or in all situations. Doctors and nurses are the primary users of medical devices in healthcare. Looking at the results, we see that human factors contribute to a large number of errors and most of these are modifiable to a limited extent. Bringing user-related errors under the extended device safety net would primarily include use of cognitive artifacts, affordances, and external representations [43] . Cognitive artifacts are human-made materials, devices, and systems that extend peopleÕs abilities in perceiving objects, encoding and retrieving information from memory, and problem solving (Gillan and Schvaneveldt [44] ).
Based on the error categories, the situational research pertaining to users of the system can be split into the following subcategories:
Number of users. Healthcare is an excellent example of collaborative cognition [5] . Execution of a single task may involve complex interactions and communication among many users. As the number of individuals and the intermediary interactions increase, the likelihood of loss or transmutation of information increases [23] . Apart from numbers, variation in the expertise hierarchy can further this information loss. Prompts, reconfirmations, and alerts are built into devices to safeguard against this information loss, but having a uniform set of such features is not practical. Norman [45] argues that well-designed artifacts could reduce the need for users to remember large amounts of information, whereas poorly designed artifacts increase the knowledge demands on users and the burden on their working memory. A balance needs to be struck so that these features match the setting. Research on the type and range of users possible for the prospective setting of the device needs to be completed and then translated into appropriate affordances and external representations. User authorization. Error categories that point at inappropriate users of the device were found in the scenario concerned with the ventilator machine (Scenario 2) as well as the one with the heparin infusion pump (Scenario 3). Authorization to make changes in device settings is an important issue in the health care setting where multiple users as well as non-users (visitors, family members) exist. Unqualified, untrained users attempting to change device settings can lead to catastrophic events. Controlled authorization and secure operation of a device can be achieved with the use of locks and constraints, which need to be built in at critical locations. Due consideration should be given to workflow issues as emphasized in the previous paragraph.
Policies and protocols of the system
A standard set of policies and protocols, although desirable, is not always possible. The tricky thing about policies is that they are frequently updated and changed. Our modifications to the design cycle started with the users and now extend to their specific interactions and the policies that govern them. Based on the error categories, the following subcategories can be used: Order format. Variations in the units or mode (written vs. verbal) of patient care orders were held responsible for errors in the provided scenarios. Standardization of practices at the institutional level could curtail incidents related to these variations. Building on the partial relationship of these errors to the medical device, designers could include features that allow the inclusion of logic, conversion, and alerts pertaining to orders into the device. Again this requires research on the range of policies that are followed in health care settings. Inservicing, labeling, and installation protocols. Knowledge about these factors is necessary to provide affordances or built in reminders (regarding device maintenance) that will ensure smooth maintenance and operability of the device.
Administration and setup
Judging from the analysis of the scenarios, the importance of appropriate accessibility of a device and its display and sounding alerts is appreciated. Geographic and conceptual research of the workflow in different scales of health institutions needs to be carried out. Lack of education and training about the device was another error category that presented quite often. Apart from the initial in-servicing and training provided about the device during its installation, there needs to be a mechanism to maintain the continuity of the training, since its users represent a dynamic population that will change all the time. Multiple approaches can be carried out by the provision of intuitive displays, external references, inbuilt training sessions, etc. Again these can only be conceived after adequate research about the users, the administration, and the policies of the system where the device is to be placed.
The modified version of the device design cycle is depicted in Fig. 7 . Situational research generates additional and more specific requirements for the device that are not as explicit or obvious as the initial input required for designing the device. Device engineers follow most of these situational research-generated requirements at one stage of the design cycle or the other. Many of these requirements are only appreciated after field Fig. 7 . Medical device development cycle with consideration of additional factors and inputs in order to extend safety features beyond the device niche. The additional segment of Situational Research has been included which generates knowledge pertaining to the users, policies, protocols, administration and setup of the system. Apart from these specific device requirements which were not part of the initial requirements can also be found and included in the design. Contents in the dashed boxes are the subdivisions of the entities touched upon by the situational research. testing or after the initial evaluation of prototypes. The idea behind formalizing the approach is to work on this situational information in the beginning of the device design and come up with a better prototype earlier on. Acquiring information about the users, the administration, and the policies that permeate a system is but one task, and the translation of these into useful features of the device is another; the ultimate goal being a safety net that goes beyond the physical margins of the device.
Conclusion
In the traditional sense ÔCreationÕ is meant to be an unbounded, unrestrained, and unguided process. Medical device design is a creative process, but the end product has such a potentially grave impact on human life that it cannot be allowed to evolve in an unguided fashion. Market competition, rapid phasing out of devices, and the changing of technology utilized all contribute to the race towards creating newer and better devices. Poorly conceived prototypes are worked upon only to meet compliance standards, and the essence of making the perfect device gets lost in the imposed urgency of moving the device from the drawing board to the shelf. The purpose of understanding the prospective settings of device operation and the potential errors faced is to utilize the information in building a better and safer prototype. The designers play an active role in preventing or at least curtailing the effects of a medical error by building patient safe equipment. A device design cycle emphasizing the above mentioned situational, administrative, and human factors would act as a guide for the designer to achieve these desired results.
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Appendix A.
A.1. Scenario one: nitroglycerine
In the ICU, a patientÕs condition was deteriorating and multiple therapeutic interventions were being made at the same time. As part of this situation, five medication changes needed to be made immediately in order to reverse the patientÕs condition. The nurse, receiving voice orders, was programming the infusion pump to administer one dose of nitroglycerine at 10 cm 3 /h, and mcq/kg/min doses of four other medications. The patient experienced serious decrease in blood pressure a short while later as a result. Biomedical engineering stated that the pump was operating adequately yet noted that the dose of nitroglycerine programmed in was 10 mg/kg/min; they also noted that positioning of the pump in the patientÕs room was awkward and not easily accessible from the front due to other critical care equipment being in the way. The attending physician stated that the intended dosage was clearly written in the record as being 10 cm 3 /h.
A.2. Scenario two: oxygen
A pediatric ICU physician was treating a six-monthold patient with oxygen and ordered that the infant receive 1.5 L/min. Within 3 min, the patient became hypoxic. At this point, the critical care team increased oxygen flow to 3 L/min for 10 min to compensate and was then ordered by the physician to be set to 2 L/ min. Biomedical engineering told the critical care team that they set the flow control knob between 1 and 2 L/ min not realizing that the scale numbers represented discrete settings (0 or 1 or 2 or 3 etc.) rather than continuous settings (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, etc. ). Hence, even though the knob rotated smoothly-suggesting that intermediate settings were possible-there was no oxygen flow between the settings.
A.3. Scenario three: heparin
Around 8 pm, a patient was receiving a usual infusion of heparin per the heparin protocol, around 12 cm 3 /min (1200 U/h). Due to a change in circumstances, this patient was to receive a bolus dose of Heparin IV through the infusion pump. This bolus was ordered to change at the end of one hour back to the maintenance continuous dose. A physician at the end of the hour changed the drip rate but did not check the confirm button or notice the small confirm print warning on the panel of the pump. The next morning, a nurse entered the room upon hearing the pump alarm beeping. She noted an empty bag, and that the rate set on the pump was 200 cm 3 /min. The patient had received a bolus of approximately 18,000 U of heparin. When the nurse manager investigated the event, both nurses who were caring for this patient overnight denied changing the pump infusion at all. Of note, there was a patientÕs family member in the room the entire night, though this person was never asked directly about what might have happened to the pump. Furthermore, the patient did not recall anyone changing the pump. Biomedical Engineering now has the case, and is investigating the pump. Preliminary report suggests that there was no problem with the pump but that it was misprogrammed. 
